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This Note will trace the development and present status of the right to self-determination under
international law and its applicability to the decolonization of the Falkland Islands. No attempt
will be made to determine whether Argentina’s claim to sovereignty over the Islands is valid. The
focus will be, rather, on whether the right of self-determination as set out by the United Nations
can be limited and superseded by competing territorial claims.
TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AS A LIMITATION TO THE RIGHT
OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE
INTRODUCTION
The importance of resolving competing claims of nations to
territories in the process of decolonization' was highlighted by the
recent armed conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom
in the South Atlantic.2 At stake in the Anglo-Argentine controversy
are the Falkland Islands, 3 located 772 kilometers north-east of Ar-
gentina's southern coast. 4 The Falklands are classified by the United
Nations as a non-self-governing territory,, a term used to describe a
particular type of colony. 6 The process by which the territory
should be decolonized has become the subject of much debate and
controversy.
1. See The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980) (study prepared by H. Gros Espiell, Special
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities) (an analysis of actions taken by the United Nations with respect to a large number of
non-self-governing territories); A. RICO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION (1973) (an analysis of territorial disputes involving, among others, British
Cameroons, British Togoland, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Palestine, Ruanda-Urundi, and West
Irian); Franck & Hoffman, The Right of Self-Determination in Very Small Places, 8 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 331 (1976) (an analysis of territorial disputes involving Belize, Djibouti,
the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Portuguese Timor, and Western Sahara).
2. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) on April 2, 1982. N.Y. Times,
Apr. 3, 1982, at 1, col. 5. Argentina surrendered 74 days later, on June 14, 1982. N.Y. Times,
June 15, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
3. The United Kingdom refers to the Islands by the name "Falklands," and alleges that
the word "Malvinas," by which the Islands are also known, is simply the Spanish translation.
19 U.N. GAOR C.4 Annex 8 (pt. 1) (Agenda Item 21) para. 30, U.N. Doc. A/5800/Rev. 1
(1965). Argentina, however, considers "Malvinas" the true name of the territory. Id. para.
31. Throughout this Note the Islands will be referred to as the Falklands. This does not imply
agreement with either view.
4. Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Working Paper-Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.109/712, at 2 (1982). The Falklands are actually a group of 200 islands, containing a
total land mass of 11,691 square kilometers. Id. According to a census taken in 1980, their
total population numbers 1,813. Id.
5. The Islands were listed as such in an early resolution, pursuant to a submission by the
United Kingdom. G.A. Res. 66, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 124-26 (1946). In the immediate
post-war period, the General Assembly actively sought to organize and obtain information on
these territories. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 142, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 48 (1947).
6. See G.A. Res. 742, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953).
This resolution lists factors which should be taken into account when determining whether a
territory is non-self-governing. Id. at 22. Several years later a resolution summarized these
characteristics:
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Colonial relationships are not permitted under contemporary
international law,7 and the United Nations has repeatedly urged
Argentina and the United Kingdom to negotiate a solution to the
Falkland situation." The United Kingdom is charged with adminis-
tering the Islands until they are decolonized.9 Argentina, however,
asserts that historic ties to the Islands place them within its sover-
eign territory.' 0
[T]erritories . . . known to be of the colonial type. . . . [T]erritories whose peoples
have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.
Prima jacie . . . a territory which is geographically separate and is distinct
ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it.
• . . [A]dditional elements may be . . . of an administrative, political, juridi-
cal, economic or historical nature. If they affect the relationship between the
metropolitan State and the territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places
the latter in a position or status of subordination they support the presumption that
[the territory is non-self-governing].
G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 29, U.N. Doe. A/4684 (1960).
7. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960),
states:
Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for
independence in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories,
[r]ecognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonial-
ism in all its manifestations,
[s]olemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional
end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations;
[a]nd to this end . . .
[ijmmediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories
or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all
powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions . . . in order to
enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.
Id. at 66-67. For a discussion on how the provisions of resolution 1514 became part of
international law, see infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
8. See G.A. Res. 37/9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/9, at 1 (1982); G.A. Res. 31/49, 31 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 122, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976); G.A. Res. 3160, 28 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 30) at 108, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 2065, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
14) at 57, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
9. See G.A. Res. 66, supra note 5. The duties of administering states were initially set
out in the Charter of the United Nations. U.N. CH-ARTER art. 73. See also infra notes 31-32
and accompanying text (an analysis of the obligations toward non-self-governing territories,
as contained in the Charter).
10. 37 U.N. GAOR (14th plen. mtg.) at 106-07, U.N. Doc. A/37/PV.14 (prov. ed.
1982). Argentina argues that when it gained its independence from Spain in 1816 it succeeded
to Spain's rights over the former colonial territory. Therefore, the United Kingdom's acquisi-
tion of the Islands by force in 1833 violated Argentina's sovereignty, and Argentina has never
accepted the legality of the United Kingdom's occupation. Id. For a detailed explanation of
the Argentine legal claim, made by a Venezuelan delegate, as well as an analysis of the
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Much of the disagreement preventing an accord" centers on
the interpretation of United Nations resolutions.' 2 The United
Kingdom claims that the Falklands population has a right under
international law to determine the future status of the Islands
regardless of any territorial claims which may exist.' 3 The United
Kingdom, therefore, refuses to consider Argentina's sovereign
claims.' 4 Argentina contends that the United Nations resolutions
permit territorial claims to prevail under certain circumstances,
and insists that this issue must be resolved first.' 5 It is certain that a
peaceful resolution will not be possible without a careful analysis of
the United Nations' position regarding the scope of the right to self-
determination.'
doctrine of uti possidetis, by which nations gaining independence automatically inherit the
colonial boundaries, see 28 U.N. GAOR C.4 (2074th mtg.) at 293-98, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/
SR.2074 (1973).
11. Argentina claimed, as early as 1973, that negotiations were at a standstill, and
placed the blame upon the United Kingdom. See 28 U.N. GAOR, supra note 10, para. 73. In
July of 1981 Argentina repeated its claim that "no substantial progress has been made since
negotiations were undertaken pursuant to resolution 2065. ... U.N. Doe. A/36/412, at 1
(1981).
12. See infra notes 13-15.
13. U.N. Doc. S/15,007, at 1-2 (1982) (letter dated April 28, 1982 from the Permanent
Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations).
Self-determination is usually referred to these days. . . not as a principle, but rather
as an "inalienable right": in other words, it is a right which cannot be taken away.
This right derives principally from the Charter and the Covenants on Human
Rights ....
The Falkland Islanders are a people. . . . They are a permanent popula-
tion. . . .The United Kingdom cannot accept that the right of self-determination as
enshrined in the Charter and the Human Rights Covenants is subject to a special
exception in the case of the Falkland Islands ...
Whilst no doubt much time and energy could be spent in reviewing the history
of the Falkland Islands between the first settlement in 1764 and 1833, and whilst the
United Kingdom is confident about the strength of its legal case over that period,
these factors cannot be allowed to override the right of self-determination.
Id. at 1-2.
14. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/712, at 2 (1982).
15. See 31 U.N. GAOR (85th plen. mtg.) paras. 51, 53, U.N. Doc. A/31/PV.85 (1976).
In February 1981, during a round of talks held in New York City, the Argentine delegation
rejected a proposal by the United Kingdom that there be a "freeze" on further discussions of
sovereignty for a determined period of time. Special Committee on the Situation With
Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/670, at 6 (1981).
16. Argentina has implied that one reason for its invasion of the Falklands was the lack
of progress in the negotiations. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. In a statement
made shortly before the invasion, Argentina said:
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This Note will trace the development and present status of the
right to self-determination under international law and its applica-
bility to the decolonization of the Falkland Islands. No attempt will
be made to determine whether Argentina's claim to sovereignty
over the Islands is valid. 17 The focus will be, rather, on whether the
right of self-determination as set out by the United Nations can be
limited and superseded by competing territorial claims.
I. LEGAL EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION
The concept of a right to self-determination has existed for
centuries,' 8 but until recently it has had little legal significance.',
Before the United Nations clearly defined and applied the right,20 it
was regarded as simply "the right of nations to sovereign indepen-
The new system [of negotiations] is an effective measure to arrive at a prompt
solution.
However, if this does not come about, if there is no response from the British
side, Argentina reserves the right to put an end to the operation of such a mecha-
nism and freely choose the procedure it deems fit in accordance with its interests.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/712, at 4 (1982) (emphasis added).
In response to a question regarding the above statement, Richard Luce, Minister of State
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and head of the United Kingdom's negotiating
team, answered: "I can tell the hon. Gentleman that, without any shadow of a doubt, there
will be no contemplation of any transfer of sovereignty without consulting the wishes of the
islanders ...." 19 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 264 (1982). Less than a month later, Argen-
tina invaded the Islands. See supra note 2.
17. For an insightful analysis of the history of the Falkland Islands starting with their
discovery until the early 1900's, see J. GOEBEL, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (2d
ed. 1971).
18. See generally H. JOHNSON, SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF NA-
TIONS 19-58 (1967); U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-43
(1972). There seems to be little agreement among historians as to how the phrase and the
concept originated. Toynbee traces its origin to the Greek idea of city-states. See generally A.
TOYNBEE, HELLENISM (1959). Others refer to the American Declaration of Independence and
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which granted the people the
right to decide their own destiny through democratic means. See, e.g., R. ARON, PEACE AND
WAR 81-82 (1966). Winston Churchill credits the invention of the phrase to Johann Fichte. 4
W. CHURCHILL, THE WORLD CRISIS 208 (1929). Umozurike attributes some of the modern
principles of the right to the American President Woodrow Wilson. U. UMOZURIKE, supra, at
13.
19. See Eagleton, Self-Determination in the United Nations, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 92
(1953). Self-determination did not acquire a degree of legal enforceability until the United
Nations became actively involved. Id.
20. See infra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
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dence. '21 More recently, as the old colonial empires have been
dismantled, 22 the right has acquired a new importance. 23
The United Nations defines self-determination as the right of
peoples to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development. ' 24 By this broad
definition alone, the right to self-determination could apply to a
multitude of situations, including the Falklands. When and how
the right to self-determination is to be exercised, however, is intri-
cately related to its evolution. 25
The right to self-determination for colonial territories is now a
principle of international law. 26 Numerous resolutions of the United
Nations, 27 as well as its Charter, 2 have established that the right is
applicable to colonized territories. 21
The Charter of the United Nations mentions the right to self-
determination in two articles. 30 However, the Charter's language is
21. U. UMOZURIKE, supra note 18, at 3.
22. See H. BOKOR-SzEG6, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLA-
TION 46-47 (1978). The disintegration of the old colonial empires and the emergence of a
complex interacting world community has led directly to changes in international law. The
right to self-determination is an integral part of these changes. Id.
23. See infra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
24. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 7, para. 2.
25. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
26. J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (1979). "The
principle of self-determination as a general principle of international law ...commands
substantial academic support. In the absence of any compelling considerations of principle
there would be little justification for rejecting it as a part of the substantive law." Id.
(footnote omitted).
27. See infra notes 35-58 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
29. The numerous resolutions passed by the General Assembly on the right to self-
determination have usually been addressed to non-self-governing territories. See, e.g., G.A.
Res. 1514, supra note 7, at 66-67. Article 73 of the Charter, which is sometimes viewed as
establishing self-determination as a principle of international law, see infra notes 30-32 and
accompanying text, is part of a chapter entitled "Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing
Territories." U.N. CHARTER ch. XI.
30. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55. Article I states that one purpose of the United Nations is
"[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples." Id. art. 1, para. 2. Article 55 continues:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall
promote. . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamen-
tal freedom for all.
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not strong enough to establish the right for colonized territories. 31
Some commentators have argued that the Charter was intended to
impose only a moral obligation upon administering states, an obli-
gation which fell within their internal jurisdiction. 32 The lack of
consensus regarding the scope of this right makes it improbable that
provisions of the Charter are sufficient to establish the right of self-
determination as a principle of international law.
Id. art. 55. Article 56 states: "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55." Id. art. 56.
31. The legal obligations of administering states towards their non-self-governing terri-
tories are treated within article 73. U.N. CHARTER art. 73. Although the right to self-
determination is not expressly mentioned, some writers suggest that there is an implicit
acceptance of the right as applicable to colonized territories. See The Right to Self-Determi-
nation: Historical and Current Development on the Basis of United Nations Instruments,
U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1 (1981) (a study prepared by A. Cristescu, Special Rap-
porteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minori-
ties); U. UMOZURIKE, supra note 18, at 52-53.
The first source of law recognized by the International Court of Justice comprises
"[i]nternational conventions establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states."
I.C.J. STAT. art. 38(1)(a). Among these "international conventions" are treaties, which
includes the Charter. See R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1 (1963). As co-signatories of the Charter, the
member-states are obligated to recognize and carry out their obligations contained therein.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para. 1. Since the vast majority of the countries in the world are
members of the United Nations, the Charter should be recognized as a source of international
law under article 38 of the Statute of the Court. See KOPELMANAS, L'ORGANISATION DES
NATIONS UNIES 199-200 (1947), cited in Cionanu, Impact of the Characteristics of the
Charter Upon Its Interpretation, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 9 (1975). Therefore, if the Charter clearly sets out a right of self-determination for
colonial peoples, this would place it within international law. However, a literal reading of
article 73 does not appear to support this view. There are no explicit references to self-
determination, and implicit ones seem to refer to an internal, not external, right. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 73. Thus, arguments have been made that the only obligation of administering
states under the Charter is to ensure that the people of these territories establish self-
government, not necessarily accompanied by a change in their territory's status. See H.
BOKoR-SzEG6, supra note 22, at 52. External self-determination is at issue in the Falklands.
See generally G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 6, at 29 (options under external self-determination).
32. See generally J. CRAwFORD, supra note 26, at 368-69. Paragraph (e) of article 73
appears to be the only section which implies a legal obligation. However, this section simply
places an obligation upon administering states to supply information on their territories to the
General Assembly. Bokor-Szeg6 believes that this was the result of a compromise between pro
and anti colonial forces during the drafting of the Charter. H. BOKOR-SzEG6, supra note 22, at
52. Article 76 of the Charter, which clearly sets forth independence as a goal for trust
territories, satisfied the anticolonial forces, while article 73,' which applies to non-self-
governing territories, satisfied the pro-colonial ones. Id.
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Although the General Assembly lacks the power to legislate
norms, 33 legal scholars agree that its resolutions can become cus-
tomary international law.3 4 The first resolutions to apply self-deter-
33. See generally J. CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECT OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 11
(1969); R. HIGGINS, supra note 31, at 1. D. NINcic, THE PROBLEM OF SOVERFGNTY IN THE
CHARTER AND IN THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 35 (1970). There is a general consensus
that resolutions of the General Assembly were never meant to be international law by virtue
of their mere passage. Id. The wording of the Charter never grants the General Assembly
legislative powers; instead it consistently limits it to an exhortatory capacity. See U.N.
CHARTER arts. 10-17.
Articles 10-17 list the powers of the General Assembly. Throughout these articles the
words "'may recommend" consistently refer to the body's authority. Id. On the other hand,
when listing the powers of the Security Council, which does have the power to bind members
by some of its decisions, the wording changes to: "Members... agree to accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council .... " Id. art. 25. During the actual drafting of the
Charter at Dumbarton Oaks, a proposal that the General Assembly be "authorized to enact
rules of international law which should become binding upon members" was overwhelmingly
rejected by a vote of 26-1. Doc. 507, 11/2/22, 9 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 70 (1945).
34. See generally H. BOKoR-SzEG6, supra note 22, at 33-40; J. CASTAREDA, supra note
33, at 105-06; R. HIGGINS, supra note 31, at 5; THE DAVID DAVIES MEMORIAL INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 5 (1972); U. UMOzuRIKE, supra note 18, at
189-90; Joyner, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the
Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 445, 457-59 (1981).
Customary international law is one of the four sources of international law accepted by the
International Court of Justice. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38(1)(b). In order for principles to evolve
through custom they must fulfill certain requirements. Among these is a "clear and continu-
ous habit of performing certain actions [by the states] in the conviction that they are
obligatory under international law." R. HIGGINS, supra note 31, at 1-2. Law created through
state practice must satisfy two prerequisites: (1) the practice must adequately define the norm
created; and (2) a sufficient number of states must accept, even if implicitly, the legality of
the rule. Joyner, supra, at 458.
Although traditionally a lengthy process, the evolution of customary norms has been
greatly accelerated in the second half of this century. H. BOKoI-SzEG6, supra note 22, at 40.
This is due, in part, to the increased interaction among states through such organs as the
United Nations. Id. at 40-41. The expansion in the number of independent states has
transformed the world from a largely homogeneous one dominated by large colonial powers,
principally from Western Europe, into a complex multitude of states. See Joyner, supra, at
445-46. Therefore, part of the body of law created by the Western powers is antiquated, and
should not be applied to the younger nations. Id. There is now a greater receptivity to the
creation of new norms within international law. K. WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 167 (1964). The moment a principle becomes customary law, however, cannot
be ascertained precisely. See R. HIGGINS, supra note 31, at 6-7. It is an evolution which
parallels the growth of the international community.
The United Nations' creation of customary international law, as evidenced by resolu-
tions and their application, is often criticized. See, e.g., J. HovET, BLOC POLITICS IN THE
UNITED NATIONS (1960). Writers claim that the United Nations is so politically motivated that
states do not necessarily believe in the legality of the principle voted upon. Id. Although there
is some truth to these assertions, this is not always the case, especially in the area of self-
determination. First, it is important to remember that in the evolution of customary norms it.
is not necessary for the states to believe that a resolution of the United Nations is itself legally
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mination to non-self-governing territories appeared in 1952, 35 but
only urged administering states to promote self-determination
within the territories.3 6 In 1960, the General Assembly finally
placed a legal obligation upon the administering states to enforce
the right. 37 Resolution 1514 38 declared colonialism to be illegal, and
enforceable, but that the motivating principle is. J. CASTA&EDA, supra note 33, at 168, 171.
Consequently, when the General Assembly passes a resolution ordering an administering
state to grant self-determination to a non-self-governing territory, it is not necessary for the
Assembly to believe that the state is under a legal obligation. It is necessary, however, that
the General Assembly believe that self-determination is a legal principle. Some writers also
believe that there is no distinction between political and legal motivations when a state casts a
vote in the General Assembly.
Perhaps the purest analytical conception of "law" is that in which an impartial
judge objectively applies a pre-established rule to decide a controversy. And perhaps
the purest analytical concept of "politics" is that in which the stronger influence or
interest regulates the social distribution of values. In the real world, however,
judges cannot avoid exercising at least some political discretion in the decision of
cases. And in any stable political system, the political process is also subject to
normative constraints.
M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1961).
Likewise, "[tihe essential nature of relations between states, in which there is no sharp
division between legal and political obligations, has expressed itself within the United Na-
tions." C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (1965). It can also
be said that a principle which is consistently applied by the member states over time meets
the required degree of belief in its legality.
Some writers still fail to recognize self-determination as a norm in international law. See
generally J. CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 95 n.72; Suzuki, Self-Determination and World
Public Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779 (1976). Most writers, however, accept it. "[T]here is
almost complete unanimity that self-determination applies to colonial peoples. ... U.
UMozu~iKE, supra note 18, at 190. See also J. CRAWFORD, supra note 26. The International
Court of Justice has also recognized the legality of the right of self-determination. See
Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-36 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16).
35. See G.A. Res. 637 A, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953);
G.A. Res. 545, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 36, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952). The resolu-
tions prior to 1952 only requested information from the administering states regarding the
progress made by the non-self-governing territories toward internal self-government, as
provided for in the Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 73, para. e. See infra note 49. It appears that
their legal obligation focused more on providing information than ensuring that meaningful
progress was achieved in the area of self-determination. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 327, U.N. Doc.
A/1251, at 41 (1949).
36. G.A. Res. 637 A, supra note 35, provides in part:
The States Members of the United Nations responsible for the administration of
Non-Self-Governing . . . Territories shall take practical steps, pending the realiza-
tion of'the right of self-determination and in preparation thereof, to ensure the
direct participation of the indigenous populations in the legislative and executive
organs of government of those Territories, and to prepare them for complete self-
government or independence.
Id.
37. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 7.
38. Id.
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urged that control over the administered territories be transferred
to their inhabitants.39 The burden was placed upon the administer-
ing states to ensure that the right to self-determination was en-
forced.40 The resolution passed by a vote of eighty-nine to zero,
with nine countries abstaining. 41
Resolution 1514 was followed closely by resolution 1541,42
which set out the three instances in which a non-self-governing
territory reaches a full measure of self-government: "(a). Emergence
as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free association with an
independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State."-43
The resolution stressed that each form of decolonization could only
become effective if accomplished through "free consultation" with
the non-self-governing territory. 44
The importance of these two resolutions in establishihg a right
of self-determination for non-self-governing territories cannot be
overemphasized. 45 These resolutions state that self-determination is
an enforceable present right. 46 They therefore nullify previous ar-
39. Id. at 66-67.
40. Id.
41. See 15 U.N. GAOR (947th plen. mtg.) para. 34, U.N. Doc. A/PV.947 (1960). The
abstaining countries were Australia, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, France, Portugal,
South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Id. At the time, most of
these countries represented the major colonial powers.
42. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 6.
43. Id. principle VI. Portugal and South Africa were the only states to vote against the
resolution. 15 U.N. GAOR (948th plen. mtg.) para. 88, U.N. Doc. A/PV.948 (1960).
44. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 6, at principle VII.
45. The importance of resolution 1514, supra note 7, is not only its language, see infra
notes 46-50 and accompanying text, but also the fact that it is a declaration. Declarations
require a two-thirds majority to pass, U.N. CHARTER art. 18, para. 2, and are ultimately
more compelling. A committee of the United Nations stated that:
[I]n view of the greater solemnity and significance of a "declaration", it may be
considered to impart, on behalf of the organ adopting it, a strong expectation that
Members of the international community will abide by it. Consequently, in so far as
the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom
become recognized as laying down rules binding upon States.
[A] "declaration" is a solemn instrument resorted to only in very rare cases
relating to matters of major and lasting importance where maximum compliance is
expected.
U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/L.610, at 1-2 (1962).
46. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 7, for example, states: "Inadequacy of political, eco-
nomic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying
independence. . . . Immediate steps shall be taken, in ...Non-Self-Governing Territo-
ries . . . to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or
reservations. ... Id. at 67.
1983]
452 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:443
guments of the administering states used to prevent colonial territo-
ries from asserting the right. 47 An administering state can no longer
point to a population's lack of political sophistication as a reason for
denying them a plebiscite, as was formerly possible under the am-
biguous wording of the Charter. 48
Resolution 1514 is the culmination of efforts by the United
Nations to bring the rights of the people of non-self-governing
territories wholly within its jurisdiction. 41 Non-self-governing terri-
tories now have international legal personalities distinct from those
of the administering states. Administering states are estopped from
claiming that the implementation of the right falls within their
domestic jurisdiction .50
47. See generally R. HIGGINS, supra note 31, at 91-92. During the early stages of the
evolution of the right there was an apparent conflict between self-determination and article
2(7) of the Charter. Article 2(7) states: "Nothing contained in the present Charier shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of any state. ... U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. Under the theory that the
Charter mandated only development of internal self-government in colonized territories, see
infra note 48 and accompanying text, states claimed non-self-governing territories were part
of their metropolitan jurisdiction, and therefore their international status was not the concern
of the United Nations. See R. HIGGINS, supra note 31, at 90-92; Franck, The Stealing of the
Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 701 (1976).
48. The Charter only encouraged the development of self-determination.
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the
administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of
self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these
territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation ...
...to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations
of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free
political institutions.
U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
49. An early resolution of the General Assembly spoke of the "voluntary transmission of
information" in conformity with article 73 of the Charter. G.A. Res. 144, U.N. Doc. A/519,
at 56 (1947). Two years later, a resolution recommended that information on geography,
history, people, and human rights should cease to be voluntary. G.A. Res. 327, supra note 35.
Another resolution, in the same year, established a committee charged with overseeing the
transmission of information. G.A. Res. 332, U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 42-43 (1949). In 1951,
resolution 551 set forth a revised standard form. G.A. Res. 551, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20)
at 40-55, U.N. Doe. A/2119 (1951). It required administering states to provide additional
information regarding non-self-governing territories. The 14-page form was extremely de-
tailed. It appears to have been an attempt by the General Assembly to ensure that it would be
aware of all aspects of life within such territories. Id. Thus, for all practical purposes,
transmission of information was no longer voluntary.
50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Since 1960, the General Assembly passed several resolutions on
decolonization, each recognizing the principle of self-determination
as a legal right enforceable by non-self-governing territoriesf.5 Of
the nine countries which originally abstained in the vote on resolu-
tion 1514 in 1960,52 only South Africa remains opposed to applying
the right .5 3 The evolution of customary international law, however,
requires only a consensus, not unanimity. 54 Otherwise, the opposi-
tion of just one nation would be sufficient to prevent international
law from developing. 55
Resolutions supporting self-determination and decolonization
are meaningless unless member states show by their conduct that
they regard self-determination as a legally enforceable right.56 In
51. There are literally hundreds of resolutions regarding self-determination. For an
excellent discussion of a large number of them and their application, see The Right of Self-
Determination: Historical and Current Development on the Basis of United Nations Instru-
ments, supra note 31.
52. See supra note 41.
53. South Africa refuses to grant self-determination to the territory of Namibia, despite
repeated pleas by the General Assembly. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
The General Assembly,
[rleaffirming the inalienable right of the people of South West Africa [Nami-
bia] to freedom and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations .. .[and] resolution 1514 .. .
[rleafflirms that . . . the people of South West Africa have the inalienable right
to self-determination ...
[diecides that the Mandate .. . to be exercised .. .by .. .South Africa is
therefore terminated, that South Africa has no other right to administer the Terri-
tory ....
Id. The vote on the resolution was lopsided: 114-to-2, with 3 abstentions. Voting against it
were South Africa and Portugal, while France, the United Kingdom and Malawi abstained.
21 U.N. GAOR (1454th. plen. mtg.) para. 244, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1454 (1966).
South Africa's opposition has led to a reaffirmation of the right of self-determination.
The International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion, held by a vote of 13-to-2 that the
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal. Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 58 (Advisory Opinion of June 21). In
the text of the opinion, the Court states: "[T]he ...development of international law in
regard to non-self-governing territories . . . made the principle of self-determination applica-
ble to all of them. . . .A further important stage in this development was [resolution 15141
...which embraces all peoples and territories which 'have not yet attained independence.'"
Id. at 31.
54. See U. UMoZumIKE, supra note 18, at 189.
55. Id.
56. This is needed in order to fulfill the requirement of opinio juris in the development
of customary international law. See supra note 34.
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international law, the validity of norms is linked to their observ-
ance, especially when tracing the evolution of customary interna-
tional law through the United Nations.57 The creation of at least
seventy newly independent states, all former colonies, 58 demon-
strates that most nations have honored the resolutions on self-deter-
mination.
II. TERRITORIAL LIMITATIONS TO THE RIGHT OF
SELF-DE TERMINATION
A. Interpretations by Argentina and the United Kingdom
Disagreement over whether self-determination is a legal right
has not delayed the decolonization 5  of the few remaining non-self-
governing territories.60 Argentina and the United Kingdom recog-
nize that the General Assembly's resolutions have created a right to
self-determination enforceable with respect to non-self-governing
territories.6' They agree that colonialism is unacceptable, including
the situation in the Falkland Islands.
6 2
The United Kingdom's refusal to negotiate the Falklanders'
participation in the decolonization process 6 3 stems from differing
57. J. CASTAIEDA, supra note 33, at 15; see also infra note 110.
58. For a list of these territories, as well as an explanation of their path to independence,
see The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, supra
note 1, at 46-63. All of these states have gained independence since the drafting of the
Charter in 1945. See id.
59. See generally id. at 47-63.
60. For a history of 38 possible non-self-governing territories which have not yet been
decolonized, see id. at 47.
61. See 37 U.N. GAOR (51st plen. mtg.) at 16, 56-57, U.N. Doc. A/37/PV.51 (prov. ed.
1982). "[T]he right of self-determination, as we have repeatedly stated, is one of the essential
rights in the area of decolonization. Its position and the role it generally plays in this process is
particularly relevant." Id. at 16 (Argentina). "The purposes and principles of the Charter are
clear. I am thinking especially of the principle of self-determination. It applies to the
Falklanders as to other peoples .... The reason is that the Falkland Islands is a territory
covered by Article 73 of the Charter." Id. at 56-57 (United Kingdom).
62. Id. at 7-10 (Argentina). "[T]his Assembly has labeled colonialism in all its manifes-
tations as a crime against mankind and has laid down the legal obligation for all Members of
the international community to co-operate in bringing it to an end." Id. For the United
Kingdom's version of the responsibilities of administering states, see id. at 56-60.
63. "[T~he United Kingdom could not agree to participate in discussions of sovereignty
over the Falkland Islands." 19 U.N. GAOR Annex 8 (pt. 1), supra note 3, at 436 (United
Kingdom). "Any solution to the problem must recognize not only the right of the Falkland
Islanders to self-determination but should provide for them to express their wishes in that
regard." 28 U.N. GAOR C.4, supra note 10, para. 88 (United Kingdom).
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interpretations of the various resolutions which established the right
to self-determination. Argentina believes that the right of a territo-
ry's inhabitants to self-determination can be superseded by other
principles of international law set forth by the General Assembly.
Argentina argues that "[the] principle [of self-determination] ...is
applicable in most cases, but it is one, and only one of the principles
which should be taken into account and applied in the area of
decolonization. . . .[I]t should. . . be brought into line with other
principles, such as the principle of territorial integrity . . . .,4 In
Argentina's view, reversion to a claimant state rather than self-
determination may be the appropriate solution where historical and
geographic ties antedate the colonial relationship. 5
Another factor that should be considered, according to Argen-
tina, is the legitimacy of the population's presence on the terri-
tory.6 "The fundamental principle of self-determination must not
be utilized in order to convert illegal possession into full sovereignty
[assuming that the Falklands would vote to continue their ties with
the United Kingdom] under a mantle of protection to be provided
by the United Nations. '1 7 Argentina claims that in the Falklands,
the colonial entity is the territory itself, not its population.6 8
The United Kingdom's interpretation of the decolonization
process focuses on the rights of its inhabitants. While not conceding
Argentina's sovereignty claim over the Islands,69 the United King-
dom asserts that the Falklanders have an absolute right of self-
determination under international law, a right which is sufficient
to void even a legitimate territorial claim: 70 "He [Argentina's For-
eign Affair's Minister in 1982, Mr. Aguirre Lanari] stressed legal-
isms: I shall stress natural law and fundamental rights. He stressed
64. 31 U.N. GAOR, supra note 15, para. 51 (Argentina) (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. 19 U.N. GAOR Annex 8 (pt. 1), supra note 3, para. 29.
67. Id.
68. See U.N. Doe. A/37/353, at 1 (1982) (letter dated July 23, 1982 from the Permanent
Mission of Argentina to the United Nations). Argentina considers the Falklanders the benefi-
ciaries, not the victims, of their colonial relationship with the United Kingdom. 28 U.N.
GAOR C.4, supra note 10, at 302. They are thus even less entitled to define the question of
sovereignty.
69. See 28 U.N. CAOR C.4, supra note 10, at 301.
70. See 37 U.N. CAOR, supra note 61, at 43-45 (United Kingdom); Review and
Implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/37/389, at 2 (1982) (letter dated August 13, 1982 from the Permanent
Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations).
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sovereignty over land; I stress the rights of people .... A small
people is at stake ... but that principle [self-determination],
which applies to them, is universal." ' 7' The United Kingdom's re-
fusal to permit any change in the status of the Islands without the
Islander's explicit approval stems from this absolute version of the
right to self-determination. 72
B. Support for Argentina's and the United Kingdom's Views
Argentina's position is based on paragraph 6 of resolution
1514.73 The paragraph states: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or
total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of
a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations."'7 4 Argentina claims that paragraph
6 reflects a belief of the General Assembly that the right to self-
determination in non-self- governing territories is subject to the sov-
ereign territorial rights of claimant states.7 5 The United Kingdom,
however, points to the verb tense used in the paragraph and alleges
that it applies only to future threats to territorial integrity and not
to past incursions.76 Under this view, the purpose of this paragraph
is to ensure that resolution 1514 is not invoked by minorities within
an independent country in an attempt to legitimize a secessionist
movement.
7
The United Kingdom supports its position by citing article 73
of the Charter, as well as numerous resolutions. 78 Resolution 1514,
for example, states in its preamble:
71. See 37 U.N. GAOR, supra note 61, at 43-45 (United Kingdom).
72. 31 U.N. GAOR C.4 (11th mtg.) para. 10, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/31/SR.11 (1976). "The
United Kingdom .. .[is] committed to the principle of self-determination for all Non-Self-
Governing Territories, and it follow[s] that the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants
must be a prime consideration for it in considering the future of the Falklands." Id.
73. See 31 U.N. GAOR, supra note 15, para. 53.
74. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 7, at 67.
75. See 31 U.N. GAOR, supra note 15, para. 53. "I might only remind you that
resolution 1514 (XV) establishes quite clearly, in paragraph 6, that in certain circumstances-
including, without any doubt, those deriving from acts of territorial usurpation against a
country-the applicable principle is territorial integrity and not self-determination." Id.
76. See 19 U.N. GAOR C.4 Annex 8 (pt. 1), supra note 3, para. 109.
77. See generally M. POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 44
(1982); Franck & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 370.
78. See 37 U.N. GAOR (53d plen. mtg.) at 107, U.N. Doe. A/37/PV.53 (prov. ed.
1982); 37 U.N. SCOR (2366th mtg.) at 71-72, U.N. Doe. S/PV.2366 (prov. ed. 1982). For a
discussion of article 73, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all de-
pendant peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the
attainment of their independence,
[a]ware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial
of... freedom of such peoples,...
[alffirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely
dispose of their natural wealth,...
[c]onvinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to
complete freedom, ...
[s]olemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy
and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifes-
tations; [a]nd to this end [d]eclares that:
• ..All peoples have the right to self-determination.7"
Resolution 2625, specifically mentioned by the United Kingdom as
supportive of its position, 0 adds: "[Member states have an obliga-
tion to] . . . bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to
the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned." 81
The United Kingdom states that the language of these two
important resolutions prohibits exceptions to the right of self-deter-
mination by inhabitants of non-self-governing territories.8 2 United
Nations resolutions consistently refer to self-determination as a right
which all peoples possess, and indicate that it is the only process by
which colonialism can be terminated.83 This very consistency lends
some support to the United Kingdom's claim that the right of self-
determination is intended to be an absolute right for the popula-
tions of non-self-governing territories.
C. Interpretation and Application of the Resolutions
1. The International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice addressed the issue of terri-
torial limitations on self-determination in the Western Sahara advi-
79. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 7, at 66-67.
80. 37 U.N. SCOR, supra note 78, at 72.
81. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, 124, U.N. Doe. A/8028
(1970).
82. See 37 U.N. GAOR, supra note 78; 37 U.N. SCOR, supra note 78, at 72.
83. See, e.g., supra notes 24-29, 38-44 and accompanying text.
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sory opinion.8 4 Several Justices of the Court recognized the existence
of territorial limitations in dicta. 85 Justice Singh wrote in a separate
opinion that situations could arise in which prior legal ties between
a territory and a claimant state would bring into effect paragraph 6
of resolution 1514, and force reintegration of the territory.86 In
another separate opinion, Justice Petr~n recognized that "[where]
the territory belonged, at the time of its colonization, to a State
which still exists today. . .[the claim would be] on the basis of [the
State's] territorial integrity."87 Justice Petr~n also stated that "in
certain specific cases one must equally take into account the princi-
ple of the national unity and integrity of States . *."..88
At no point in the opinion did the Court recognize an absolute
right to self-determination for the population of Western Sahara, a
non-self-governing territory.89 Instead, the Court engaged in an
extensive exploration of Morocco's, Mauritania's, and Spain's his-
torical ties to the territory.90 Although this analysis had been re-
quested by the General Assembly, 9' the issue would have been moot
under international law had the Court recognized the Saharans'
absolute right to self-determination. The Court decided that the
historical ties between Western Sahara and Morocco and Maurita-
nia were not sufficient to apply any territorial limitations,9 2 but the
Court implied that in other appropriate cases historical ties might
require territorial reintegration. 93
84. 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16).
85. The request for the advisory opinion, as formulated by the General Assembly, G.A.
Res. 3292, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 103, 104, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), asks the
Court two specific questions: " 1. Was Western Sahara ... at the time of colonization by
Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?' If the answer to the first question is in
the negative, 'II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco
and the Mauritanian entity?"' Id. at 104. The Court acknowledged in its opinion that it did
not feel constrained by the specific request:
Extensive arguments and divergent views have been presented to the Court as to
how, and in what form, the principles of decolonization apply in this instance,
in the light of the various General Assembly resolutions on decolonization in gen-
eral . . . .This matter is not directly the subject of the questions put to the Court,
but it is raised as a basis for an objection to the Court's replying to that request.
Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 30.
86. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 79-80.
87. Id. at 110.
88. Id.
89. See generally id. at 31-37.
90. Id. at 40-68.
91. See G.A. Res. 3292, supra note 85.
92. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 69.
93. Specifically, the Tribunal concludes that "the Court has not found legal ties of such
a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of
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The Western Sahara opinion, however, is not as definitive a
statement on territorial limitations as Argentina professes it to be. 4
The limitations were set out only in dicta, and the Court failed to
provide guidelines for determining when sufficient ties might ex-
ist. 95 Justice Petr6n stated:
It seems however that questions of this kind are not yet consid-
ered ripe for submission to the Court. The reason is doubtless the
fact that the wide variety of geographical and other data which
must be taken into account in questions of decolonization have
not yet allowed of the establishment of a sufficiently developed
body of rules and practice to cover all the situations which may
give rise to problems.""
Using this reasoning, the United Kingdom could argue that territo-
rial limitations to the right of self-determination are not developed
sufficiently under customary international law to be enforced. 97
2. The Drafters' Intent
Evidence of drafters' intent regarding resolution 1514 does not
clearly favor either side. The speeches in the General Assembly
emphasized the right of self-determination, not its limitations.98
However, many delegates seemed to fear that the right to self-
determination could be used as an excuse for secession.99
Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and
genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory." Id. at 68 (footnote omitted).
94. See 31 U.N. GAOR, supra note 15, at 1295-96.
95. See generally Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 31-37.
96. Id. at 110.
97. A rule cannot become customary international law unless it is clearly defined. See
Joyner, supra note 34, at 458.
98. The debates surrounding the passage of resolution 1514 in the General Assembly
lasted 16 days. 15 U.N. GAOR (925th-39th, 944th-47th plen. mtgs.) at 981-1200, 1231-84,
U.N. Does. A/PV.925 to A/PV.939, A/PV.944 to A/PV.947 (1960). Most of the countries
represented in the Assembly received an opportunity to be heard on the matter. With the
exception of minor remarks, the only nations which engaged in an analysis of paragraph 6
were Honduras, Guatemala, Indonesia, the Netherlands and Morocco. See infra note 100.
99. Although it is not apparent from the speeches, Franck and Hoffman wrote in 1976:
[M]ost states voting for Resolution 1514's paragraph 6 probably did so in the belief
that they were creating a sort of "grandfather clause": setting out the right of self-
determination for all colonies but not extending it to parts of decolonized states and
seeking to ensure that the act of self-determination occur within the established
boundaries of colonies rather than within sub-regions.
Franck & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 370.
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References to paragraph 6 tended to support Argentina's inter-
pretation.100 The delegate from Guatemala sought to introduce an
amendment during the drafting stages of the resolution which
would have insured that the right to self-determination would not
be used to impair the right of a state to recover territory.' 0' He
decided to withdraw the amendment 102 after being told by several
countries,103 notably Indonesia, 0 4 that paragraph 6 already applied
to situations in which recovery of territory was involved. This was
followed only by the vocal disagreement of the Netherlands, which
although not in accord with Indonesia's interpretation of the para-
graph, offered no alternative explanation.10 5 The Soviet Union, an
original sponsor of resolution 1514, opposed Guatemala's amend-
ment, and urged that decolonization follow a case by case ap-
proach.106 Argentina points to these speeches as evidence of the
drafters' intent concerning paragraph 6.107 Yet, only a small minor-
ity of the General Assembly participated in these discussions.108
Furthermore, most of the countries which did participate were
embroiled in territorial disputes of their own. 09
3. Application of the Resolutions
The final interpreter of United Nations resolutions is the Orga-
nization itself." 0 The manner in which it applies these resolutions
100. See generally 15 U.N. GAOR (936th, 945th-947tfi mtgs.) at 1147, 1152-53, 1258,
1267, 1269, 1271, 1275-77, 1284, U.N. Does. A/PV.936, A/PV.945 to A/PV.947 (1960)
(speeches by Indonesia, Honduras, the Netherlands, Guatemala and Morocco).
101. 15 U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 87) at 7, U.N. Doe. A/L.325 (1960).
102. 15 U.N. GAOR, supra note 100, at 1276-77 (Guatemala).
103. Id. at 1147, 1152-53, 1158, 1267, 1269, 1271.
104. Id. at 1271.
105. Id. at 1276.
106. Id. at 1258.
107. E. Ros, LAS CONCLUSIONES Y RECOMENDACIONES DEL COMITE ESPECIAL DE LAS
NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LA APLICACION DE LA RESOLUcI6N 1514 (XV) EN EL CASO DE LAS ISLAS
MALVINAS 18 (1965).
108. See generally supra note 100.
109. In 1960, Guatemala was pursuing its claim to Belize from the United Kingdom, 15
U.N. GAOR (874th plen. mtg.) para. 218, U.N. Doc. A/PV.874 (1960); Morocco claimed
Mauritania, Ifni, and parts of Western Sahara from France and Spain, 15 U.N. GAOR C.4
(1005 mtg.) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.1005 (1960); Indonesia claimed West Irian from the
Netherlands. 15 U.N. GAOR, supra note 43, at 1271.
110. See generally J. CASTAIEDA, supra note 33, at 15.
Contrary to what occurs within the state, in the international order there is no
organ whose specific function is to determine the constitutionality of the authorities
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to specific situations, and its subsequent resolutions on the same
subject are indicative of the resolutions' true scope. The United
Nations' treatment of the territories of Gibraltar and Ifni provide
guidance in this area."'
a. Gibraltar
In its resolutions concerning the Rock of Gibraltar, the Gen-
eral Assembly recognizes territorial limitations to the right of self-
determination in non-self-governing territories. Gibraltar is a terri-
tory administered by the United Kingdom." 12  Until recently,
sovereignty over the Rock was governed by the Treaty of Utrecht,
signed in 1713.1 3 The terms of the treaty provide that Gibraltar
was to be supervised by the United Kingdom and to revert automat-
ically to Spain before any change in its status could take place." 4
This aspect of the treaty is questionable today since any treaty
imposing colonial relationships would be superseded by recent de-
velopments in international law." 5 Even so, the treaty serves as
that apply legal norms. . . .[E]ach international organ (not subordinate to another)
determines the constitutionality oJ its own acts. This factor, plus the extreme
vagueness with which the powers of a political organ such as the Assembly are
enunciated, easily explain why the very practice of the organ becomes, with the
passage of time, the decisive factor in determining the legal scope of its own
functions.
Id. A resolution which has become binding, such as resolution 1514, may assume characteris-
tics similar to those of a treaty. Treaties should be interpreted by the parties which are bound
by them. See I.C.J. STAT. 38(1)(a); R. HIGGINS, supra note 31, at 1.
111. See infra notes 113-44 and accompanying text. Territorial sovereignty as a possible
limitation to a non-self-governing territory's right to self-determination has been debated in
the context of many territorial claims. The importance of the treatment of Ifni and Gibraltar
lies in the direct acceptance by the General Assembly of such limitations. Id.
112. See G.A. Res. 66, supra note 5. Gibraltar has been listed as a non-self-governing
territory in subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2353, 22
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 53, U.N. Doe. A/6716 (1967); G.A. Res. 2231, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 74, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
113. Treaty of Utrecht, July 13, 1713, Great Britain-Spain, 1 British & Foreign State
Papers 613, 28 Parry's T.S. 295.
114. The Treaty states that:
[I~n case it shall hereafter seem meet to the Crown of Great Britain to grant, sell, or
by any means to alienate therefrom the Propriety of the said Town of Gibraltar, it is
hereby agreed and concluded, that the Preference of having the same shall always
be given to the Crown of Spain before any others.
Id. art. X.
115. See generally Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 168. A supervening change in existing
law can affect the validity of title to land. "The Court thus judged that the original title
ceases to be valid if there are new facts to be considered on the basis of new law." Id. Other
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evidence that Gibraltar is part of Spain's sovereign territory, occu-
pied by the United Kingdom.16
Spain claims that the inhabitants of the Rock are not the true
population of the territory and cannot unilaterally determine the
international status of Gibraltar."17 Spain views Gibraltar as a terri-
tory which falls under the paragraph 6 exception to resolution
1514.118 The population is of mixed nationality, having arrived on
the Rock after the treaty was signed. 119 The only way to decolonize
Gibraltar, according to Spain, would be to reintegrate Gibraltar
with Spain itself.12 0
The United Kingdom's arguments for self-determination in
Gibraltar are the same as those relied upon in the Falklands dis-
pute. The United Kingdom claims that the people of Gibraltar are
the inhabitants of a non-self-governing territory 12 who enjoy all
the benefits of resolutions 1514 and 1541. Therefore the population
has a right to determine its future status regardless of competing
territorial claims. 122
The General Assembly has been monitoring the dispute for
several years. Numerous resolutions have requested the two parties
to negotiate a settlement but have not expressly mentioned any
rights of the local population to participate in the discussions.
123
Many member states have criticized the United Kingdom's refusal
cases support this position. E.g., Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
829, 845 (1928).
As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at successive
periods is to be applied in a particular case (the so-called inter-temporal law), a
distinction must be made between the creation of rights and the existence of rights.
The same principle which subjets [sic] the act creative of a right to the law in force
at the time the right arises, demands that the existence of the right, in other words
its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions required by the evolution of
law.
Id.
116. See infra note 145.
117. See 22 U.N. GAOR C.4 (1743rd mtg.) para. 41, U.N. Doe. A/C.4/SR.1743 (1967).
118. 37 U.N. GAOR (9th plen. mtg.) at 88, U.N. Doc. A/37/PV.9 (prov. ed. 1982).
119. Franck & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 376. The population consists mostly of
Maltese, Italians, Jews, and other Mediterranean peoples. Id.
120. 22 U.N. GAOR C.4, supra note 117, para. 9.
121. See generally 22 U.N. GAOR C.4 (1741st mtg.) para. 33, U.N. Doe. A/C.4/
SR.1741 (1967).
122. Id.
123. See generally G.A. Res. 2353, supra note 112; G.A. Res. 2231, supra note 112;
G.A. Dec. 31/406, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 199, 200, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).
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to transfer sovereignty over the territory to Spain 124 without the
approval of the local population. 125
Spain, 126 as well as many legal writers, 21 interprets the Gen-
eral Assembly's resolutions as supportive of its territorial claims.
Resolution 2353,128 for'example, states the General Assembly's be-
lief that rights over Gibraltar should be resolved without the partic-
ipation of the local population.2 2 The resolution followed a plebi-
scite in which the population of Gibraltar was given a choice
between continuing its present ties with the United Kingdom or
reverting to Spain. 30 The people of Gibraltar voted overwhelm-
ingly in favor of maintaining their present status.131 The resolution,
passed by a vote of seventy-three to nineteen, with twenty-seven
abstentions, 132 declared: "[T]he holding of the referendum of 10
September 1967 by the Administering power [was] a contravention
of the provisions of [the] General Assembly." ' 133 The resolution
again requested the parties to reach a negotiated settlement. ' 34
124. In 1969, the United Kingdom and Gibraltar agreed to a new constitution. The
United Kingdom was not to transfer Gibraltar to another state unless the inhabitants,
through a plebiscite, approved. See 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 23) at 53, U.N. Doe. A/7623/
Rev.1 (1974).
125. See 22 U.N. GAOR C.4, supra note 117, paras. 85-97, 99 (speeches by the
representatives of Ecuador, Honduras, and Mauritania).
126. Id. paras. 5, 8.
127. See A. Rico SUREDA, supra note 1, at 185; Franck & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 374.
128. G.A. Res. 2353, supra note 112.
129. Id.
130. Judith Hart, the United Kingdom's Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations,
commented on the plebiscite to be held in Gibraltar: "If the majority of the people of
Gibraltar vote in favour of the second alternative [continued ties with the United Kingdom],
... we will regard this choice as constituting, in the circumstances of Gibraltar, a free and
voluntary relationship of the people of Gibraltar with Britain." 748 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) 567 (1967). It is curious that independence was not an option given to the people of
Gibraltar. The United Kingdom claims that this was due to provisions of the Treaty of
Utrecht, supra note 113, which did not allow a change of status without reversion to Spain.
22 U.N. GAOR C.4, supra note 117, para. 78. However, any legitimate attempt to allow for
the exercise of self-determination by the people of Gibraltar, including the use of a plebiscite,
depends on the non-applicability of the relevant sections of the treaty, since those sections
exclude any participation by the local population in the sovereignty of Gibraltar. Treaty of
Utrecht, supra note 113. Thus, it appears that the United Kingdom is simultaneously follow-
ing the treaty and disregarding it.
131. See U.N. Doc. A/6876, at 2-3 (1967) (letter dated October 25, 1967 from the
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations). The United
Kingdom reported to the General Assembly that of 12,757 eligible voters, 12,138 voted to
maintain their present ties, while only 44 favored reversion to Spain. Id.
132. 22 U.N. GAOR (1641st plen. mtg.) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1641 (1967).
133. G.A. Res. 2353, supra note 112.
134. Id. "Invites the Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom ... to resume
without delay the negotiations ... with a view to putting an end to the colonial situation in
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There should be little doubt that the General Assembly believes that
despite Gibraltar's status as a non-self-governing territory, its popu-
lation is not entitled to self-determination.
b. Ifni
The decolonization of Ifni is further evidence that the General
Assembly accepts limitations to the right of self-determination in
non-self-governing territories. The territory of Ifni, located on Mo-
rocco's western coast, was the subject of a dispute between Spain
and Morocco. 135 Morocco claimed Ifni was a part of its territory
occupied illegally by Spain. 136 Spain, in turn, considered Ifni a non-
self-governing territory which should remain under its control until
the population, which was nomadic, could vote intelligently in a
plebiscite. 137 Resolution 2229138 refers to both Ifni and Western
Sahara, and limits the Ifnians' right to self-determination. 3 The
resolution requested Spain to transfer Ifni to Morocco bearing in
mind "the aspirations of the indigenous population." 140 The resolu-
tion considered this procedure to be in furtherance of the decoloni-
zation of the territory. 141 Because the dispute between the two
countries over Western Sahara arose at approximately the same
time, the General Assembly often treated the cases together.142 The
General Assembly invited Spain to hold a referendum in Western
Sahara "with a view to enabling the population of the Territory to
exercise freely its right to self-determination." 4 3 The difference
between the two paragraphs within the same resolution indicates
that in certain situations, such as Ifni, the General Assembly limits
the right of self-determination. The resolution also allows for the
transfer of such territory without recourse to resolution 1541.144
Gibraltar and to safeguarding the interests of the population upon the termination of that
situation." Id.
135. See G.A. Res. 2354, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 53, U.N. Doc. A/6716
(1967); G.A. Res. 2229, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 72, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
136. See 21 U.N. GAOR (1441st plen. mtg.) para. 289, U.N. Doe. A/PV.1441 (1966).
137. See 18 U.N. GAOR Annex I (Agenda Item 23, addendum) at 280-82, U.N. Doc. A/
5446/Rev.1 (1963).
138. G.A. Res. 2229, supra note 135.
139. Id. at 73.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See supra note 135.
143. G.A. Res. 2229, supra note 135.
144. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 6, at 30. According to resolution 1541,
[i]ntegration should have come about in the following circumstances: (a) The
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4. Application of the Resolutions to the Falklands Case
A comparison of the General Assembly's resolutions on the
Falklands with those covering Gibraltar strongly suggests that the
Assembly views self-determination as a limited right. In Gibraltar,
substantial evidence indicates that the Rock is part of Spain's sover-
eign territory. 145 The issue is therefore well defined: self-determina-
tion on the one hand, territorial integrity on the other. In the
Falklands, however, the historical claims set forth by Argentina are
not as clear, and they are actively disputed by the United King-
dom.146 The General Assembly's willingness to preempt the right of
self-determination in the Falklands therefore becomes highly signif-
icant.
Resolution 2065,147 the first General Assembly resolution on
the decolonization of the Falkland Islands, resembles resolution
2231 14 on Gibraltar. Resolution 2065, like resolution 2231, notes
the existence of a dispute and urges both countries to negotiate,
bearing in mind the provisions of resolution 1514. 4" The resolution
urges the two parties to consider "the interests of the population of
the Falkland Islands." 150 The resolution regarding Gibraltar recom-
integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of self-government
with free political institutions, so that its people would have the capacity to make a
responsible choice through informed and democratic processes; (b) The integration
should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting
with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed
through informed and democratic processes ....
Id. Ifni was transferred to Morocco in 1969 without the participation of the local population.
The International Court of Justice later accepted this unilateral transfer as the valid decoloni-
zation of the territory. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 35.
145. The Treaty of.Utrecht, supra note 113, which is the basis for the United Kingdom's
possession of Gibraltar, provides: "[Tihe Catholick King wills, and takes it to be understood,
that the abovementioned Property [Gibraltar] be yielded to Great Britain, without any
Territorial Jurisdiction." Id. art. X, translated in 1 A. ToYNBEE, MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF
MODERN HISTORY 1648-1967, at 223-24 (1967) (emphasis added). The statement is even
stronger in light of Spain's right of reversion, also contained in article X. Id.
146. See U.N. Doc. A/S-12/31, at 2-5 (1982) (letter dated June 30, 1982 from the
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations).
147. G.A. Res. 2065, supra note 8.
148. G.A. Res. 2231, supra note 112.
149. G.A. Res. 2065, supra note 8.
150. Id. The exact meaning of the word "interests" is subject to debate. Both the United
Kingdom and Argentina, as well as several legal writers, claim it does not include a right to
self-determination. See 31 U.N. GAOR C.4 (21st mtg.) para. 45, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/31/SR.21
(1976) (the United Kingdom feels that it is not bound by the resolution and expresses
misgivings about its fairness to the Falklanders); U.N. Doc. A/9287, at 2 (1973) (Argentina
distinguishes between "wishes" and "'interests" and concludes that the latter do not include
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mends "taking into account the interests of the people of the Terri-
tory." 151
Resolution 3160152 went beyond resolution 2065 by indicating
that "the way to put an end to this colonial situation is the peaceful
solution to the conflict of sovereignty between the Governments of
Argentina and the United Kingdom."' 153 Furthermore, the only
rights of the inhabitants mentioned in the resolution are those
specifically granted previously by resolution 2065. 154 Although reso-
lution 3160 expresses no opinion on either party's version of their
historical-territorial claims to the Islands, it does emphasize that
this aspect of the dispute must be resolved before the rights of the
Falklanders can be addressed. 55
Recognition of the Argentine position becomes more explicit
with every resolution. Resolution 31/49 156 repeats statements found
in prior resolutions and for the first time implies support for Argen-
tina's historical claims. 157 Resolution 37/9,158 adopted after the
self-determination); Franck & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 381 (resolution 2065 does not
include a provision for self-determination).
151. G.A. Res. 2231, supra note 112.
152. G.A. Res. 3160, supra note 8.
153. Id. at 109.
154. Id. at 108-09. The resolution was approved by a vote of 116-to-0, with 14 absten-
tions, including that of the United Kingdom. 28 U.N. GAOR (2202d plen. mtg.) at 23, U.N.
Doc. A/PV.2202 (1973).
155. The resolution requests the two parties to commence immediate negotiations and
to find a peaceful solution to the Falkland problem. G.A. Res 3160, supra note 8, at 108-09.
The significance of the wording can be better understood by contrasting it with resolution
2229, supra note 135, which ordered Spain to grant the right of self-determination to the
people of Western Sahara. Id.
156. G.A. Res. 31/49, supra note 8, at 122.
157. Id. The resolution bears "in mind the paragraphs related to this question contained
in the Political Declaration adopted by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of
Non-Aligned Countries, . . . and in the Political Declaration adopted by the Fifth Confer-
ence of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries." Id. Both paragraphs
openly support Argentina's territorial claim. See U.N. Doe. A/37/553, at 4, 17-18 (1982). The
resolution goes on to state that the General Assembly "[e]xpresses its gratitude for the
continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant
decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonization and to promote
the well-being of the population of the islands." G.A. Res. 31/49, supra note 8, at 122. This
section refers to Argentina's efforts in providing certain educational and other facilities to the
Falklands. Although this would not have been possible without the United Kingdom's
cooperation, there is no mention of this in the resolution. See generally 28 U.N. GAOR C.4,
supra note 10, at 301. The resolution passed by a vote of 102-1, with 32 abstentions. The
United Kingdom cast the sole negative vote. 31 U.N. GAOR, supra note 15, para. 77.
158. G.A. Res. 37/9, supra note 8.
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armed conflict, 59 once again urges both countries to negotiate, but
makes no reference to participation by the Falklanders.' 60 Speeches
in the General Assembly indicated widespread agreement that the
issue of territorial claims must be resolved before the question of
self-determination. '6'
It should be clear from the resolutions of the General Assembly
on Gibraltar, Ifni and the Falklands, as well as the Western Sahara
opinion of the International Court of Justice, that both bodies
consistently view paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 as establishing
such territorial limitations to the right of self-determination. The
General Assembly's interpretation of the right to self-determination
is especially important because that Organ, through its resolutions,
incorporated the right into international law. 16 2 Therefore, in cer-
tain limited situations, the people of non-self-governing territories
will not be able to determine their future status. Their right to vote
can be precluded by competing territorial claims.
D. Factors in the Application of Territorial Limitations
Limiting the right of self-determination has been criticized by
commentators who envision a "redrawing [of] colonial bounda-
ries ,' 163 or, worst yet, "chaos, insecurity and war."' 1 4 Uganda's
claims to parts of Kenya and the Sudan in the 1970's are examples
of what writers feel could lead to these outcomes. 65 The develop-
ment of territorial limitations within the context of the right of self-
determination, however, indicates that it applies in such limited
circumstances that these fears need not be realized.
159. Id. at 2; see also supra note 2.
160. G.A. Res. 37/9, supra note 8. The resolution does request negotiations in accord-
ance with prior resolutions. It also includes the question of the Falklands in its 38th session, to
be held during 1983. Id.
161. See, e.g., 37 U.N. GAOR (52d plen. mtg.) at 12-15, 18-22, 28-30, 31-42, 48-55, 61-
63, U.N. Doc. A/37/PV.52 (prov. ed. 1982) (speeches by the representatives of Mexico, Cuba,
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Suriname, German Democratic Republic); 37 U.N. GAOR
(53d plen. mtg.) at 3-5, 11-16, 21-22, 26-27, 42-45, 47-50, 61-70, 73-75, 77, 96, 101-02, U.N.
Doc. A/37/PV.53 (prov. ed. 1982) (speeches by the representatives of Hungary, Brazil,
Colombia, Yugoslavia, Uruguay, Soviet Union, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Poland, Viet-Nam, Albania, Zaire, Bolivia).
162. See supra notes 34, 37-46.
163. J. CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 383.
164. Franck & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 351.
165. See id.
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The right of self-determination, as developed by the United
Nations, has been applied exclusively to the decolonization of non-
self-governing territories. 16 Therefore, any territorial claims based
on limitations of the right can only be asserted against these territo-
ries. This is an important restriction since there are only a few such
territories remaining. 6 7 Territorial claims asserted against indepen-
dent states must find some other justification in international law.
A territorial claim will not supersede a non-self-governing ter-
ritory's right of self-determination unless it meets certain require-
ments. 168 The International Court of Justice has expressly recog-
nized the validity of territorial claims when the population of the
territory is not "a 'people' entitled to self-determination," or when
"a consultation was totally unnecessary, in view of special circum-
stances." 16 9 The Court has not stated what it considers to be those
special circumstances. In finding that Morocco and Mauritania
lacked sufficient ties to supersede the Saharans' right of self-deter-
mination,17 0 however, the Court implied a requirement that the
claimant state must have existed at the time of colonization of the
territory.1 7' It must also have asserted valid sovereignty over that
territory at that time. 72
166. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The right to self-determination has
become a part of international law through resolution 1514 and its companion resolutions,
which were limited to colonial territories. Id. See also Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 32.
167. A special rapporteur listed 27 non-self-governing territories in 1980. See The Right
to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, supra note 1, at 48-
57.
168. A requirement in accordance with general practice is that a claimant state must
not have peacefully and voluntarily surrendered its rights. See J. CRAwFoRD, supra note 26, at
383.
169. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 33.
170. Id. at 68.
171. Cf. id. at 63, 68. The Court concluded that although legal ties existed between
Western Sahara and what it referred to as the Mauritanian "entity" (not an independent
nation), the entity "did not have the character of a personality or corporate entity distinct
from the several emirates and tribes which composed it." Id. at 63. Thus, the ties were not
sovereign ties which could affect the right to self-determination. Id. at 68.
172. Id. at 68. Justice Singh stated this in a separate opinion:
Those legal ties which the Court found to exist at the time of Spanish colonization
... were not of such a character as to justify today the reintegration . . . of the
territory without consulting the people. The main reason for this conclusion is
simply that, at the time of Spanish colonization, there was no evidence of the
existence of one single State comprising the territory of Western Sahara and Mo-
rocco, or Western Sahara and Mauritania, which would ... attract the provisions
of paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) ....
Id. at 79-80.
1983] SELF-DETERMINATION
The General Assembly appears to agree with the Court's re- -
quirements. In the case of Guatemala's claim over Belize,173 for
example, the General Assembly refuted that country's arguments
and granted the Belizeans the right of self-determination.174 Guate-
mala based its arguments primarily on territorial claims inherited
from Spain. 75 At the time of Guatemala's independence from
Spain, however, Belize was already a colony of the United King-
dom.176 Guatemala never existed as a state at the time of the
colonization of the territory. Argentina, by comparison, was an
independent nation in 1833 when the United Kingdom claimed the
Falklands.177 Spain likewise was an independent nation at the time
of the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht. 1
78
CONCLUSION
The resolutions of the General Assembly, by fulfilling the re-
quirements of customary international law, 179 have created a right
173. Belize, formerly British Honduras, is located in Central America between Guate-
mala and the Caribbean Sea. Kunz, Guatemala v. Great Britain: In Re Belize, 40 AM. J.
INT'L L. 383 (1946). The United Kingdom has been involved in a dispute over the territory
since the 1600's, first with Spain, then later with Spain's successor to the claim, Guatemala.
Id. at 383-85.
174. G.A. Res. 3432, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 114, U.N. Doc. A/10,034
(1975), reaffirmed "the inalienable right of the people of Belize to self-determination and
independence." Id. at 115.
On September 25, 1981, Belize was admitted as a member state to the United Nations.
G.A. Res. 36/3, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 12, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981). Admission
to the United Nations has been referred to as "unchallengeable evidence that a territory
ceased to be non-self-governing." See J. CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 368.
175. See generally 30 U.N. GAOR C.4 (2162nd mtg.) at 158, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.2162
(1975). The United Kingdom bases its claim on a continuous and peaceful display of territo-
rial sovereignty for over 350 years. Id. at 156. Guatemala alleges that the United Kingdom's
occupation during the Spanish colonization was illegal. Id. at 158-60.
176. See generally Kunz, supra note 173, at 388. The basic difference between the
dispute over Belize and the dispute over the Falklands appears to be that Guatemala accepts
that the United Kingdom occupied the territory almost continuously since the 1600's, includ-
ing the time when Guatemala obtained its independence. 30 U.N. GAOR C.4, supra note
175, at 158-59. Another difference is a treaty, signed in 1859, wherein Guatemala recognized
the United Kingdom's sovereignty over the territory. Wyke-Aycinema Treaty, Apr. 30, 1859,
Great Britain-Guatemala, 49 British & Foreign State Papers 7, 16 Martens Nouveau Recueil
366. However, Guatemala claims the treaty is void. See generally Kunz, supra note 173, at
388. The United Kingdom does not use the treaty as a basis for its arguments. Id. at 387.
177. See J. GOEBEL, supra note 17, at 433.
178. 20 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA Spain 11,098-113 (1969).
179. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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of self-determination which applies to the peoples of non-self-gov-
erning territories.180 The Falkland Islands, being such a territory,
appear to fall within the ambit of the right.' 8 ' Argentina argues
that the right is not applicable where the territory is subject to a
prior historical claim placing it within the sovereign territory of the
claimant country. 182
The General Assembly and the International Court of Justice,
recognize limitations to the right. The Court's Western Sahara
opinion, and its interpretation of paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 are
definitive, 8 3 as are the General Assembly's resolutions regarding
Gibraltar, Ifni, and the Falklands themselves. 84 The United Na-
tions, as creator of the right, has also directed when and how it
should be applied. 85 Because decolonization is now mandatory
under international law, 86 territories subject to valid prior sover-
eign claims must revert to the claimant state without the participa-
tion of the inhabitants of the territory. Their rights, however, must
be safeguarded.
Before this reversion can take place, several historical require-
ments must be fulfilled. The claimant state must have existed as an
independent nation continuously since the colonization of the terri-
tory. 8 7 It must have exerted valid sovereign ties over the territory at
the time. 88 And it must have never peacefully renounced its
claim. 189
The conflict over the Falkland Islands cannot be resolved until
a careful analysis determines the validity of Argentina's territorial
claims, an analysis similar to the one conducted by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the Western Sahara case. Only then can
one decide whether the Falklanders have a right to a binding
plebiscite. For this to happen, the United Kingdom must be willing
to negotiate sovereignty over the Islands without the participation
180. See supra notes 27-58 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 79-87, 157-62 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 34, 37-51, 166-67 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 34, 37-48 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 171, 176-78 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 172, 175-76 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 168.
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of the Falklanders. Its insistence of an absolute right of self-deter-
mination is a misinterpretation of the law regarding decoloniza-
tion, a misinterpretation which has proven to be extremely costly.
Alejandro Schwed
